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Abstract 
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in 2008 has been widely regarded as a failure for 
international diplomacy in general, and for the European Union (EU) in particular. The narrative that 
has emerged suggests that, rather than taking charge of the situation, the EU was instead a “victim” 
of external machinations led by Washington and Moscow. This article challenges this view. It argues 
that, during the status process, it became clear that in the case of Kosovo there was a tension 
between the constraints imposed by international law on acts of secession and the requirements 
for stability on the ground. While Russia insisted on the former, albeit for a range of reasons that 
went beyond upholding international law, the United States placed emphasis on the latter. For their 
part, the key members of the EU eventually decided that, after having tried to win Moscow over to 
their position, they too had to ensure regional security; even if this meant circumventing the United 
Nations and the Security Council and challenging long-standing legal norms and principles 
concerning the territorial integrity of states. 
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WHEN KOSOVO UNILATERALLY DECLARED INDEPENDENCE IN 2008, IT WAS WIDELY SEEN 
to represent a failure of international diplomacy. As one leading observer noted, the end 
result of two years of status talks was a “mess” (Jackson 2007). For many Western 
observers, the ultimate responsibility for the failure to reach an agreement rested squarely 
on Moscow (MacShane 2007; Harris 2007; The Economist 2007; Joseph 2007; Bugajski and 
Joseph 2007). It was, or so they argued, Russia’s decision to veto a Security Council 
resolution authorising Kosovo’s independence that prevented Kosovo from gaining 
international legitimacy as a fully sovereign and independent state. Within the European 
Union (EU), opinions differed. Many argued that the burden of blame lay equally with 
Moscow and Washington. As one noted regional analyst has observed, “the international 
significance of a debacle that reflects poorly on all participants is […] very clear: Russia and 
the United States have combined to humiliate the European Union” (Glenny 2007).1 Few 
                                                
1 As one EU official put it, “Russia has simply decided to stop short of doing anything that would lead to real 
pressure on Serbia to strike a deal […] At the same time, Washington’s long-standing pledge to recognise 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence has always been in the back of the Kosovars’ minds” (Financial Times 
2007b). This was echoed by Massimo D’Alema, the Italian Foreign Affairs minister. As he explained, Russia and 
the United States had fed the intransigence of the two sides by taking positions that often appeared to be 
stronger than those expressed by the parties themselves (New York Times 2007b). 
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observers, however, took the view that the United States was largely responsible. One 
such voice was Alberto Navarro, the Spanish Minister for Europe. Speaking soon after the 
declaration of independence, he made little effort to hide his feelings over what had 
happened: “I’m really frustrated that the future of Kosovo has been decided in Washington 
and to some extent in Moscow, and not in Europe” (BBC News 2008b). 
This article examines the United Nations (UN)-sponsored status process and the events 
leading up to Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. It will seek to show that, 
while Russia’s position was almost certainly driven by a strong degree of self-interest and 
may possibly have had malign motives, there can be little doubt that its position was in 
fact in accordance with traditional thinking on the right of secession under international 
law. So much so that, under other circumstances, there would have been little difference 
between Moscow’s position and that of the EU. In contrast, as will be shown, the United 
States adopted an approach that circumvented standing principles of international law. 
Seeking to extricate itself from a situation that had the potential to lead to a new conflict in 
the Western Balkans – this time aimed at international administrators and peacekeepers – 
it supported Kosovo’s independence, even though this was opposed by Belgrade and was 
being undertaken without the endorsement of the UN Security Council. Therefore, in the 
international debate between the legal “constitutionalists” and the political “pragmatists” 
(The Independent 2007), Russia claimed to be the champion of the former position, whilst 
the United States led the latter camp. 
As for the view that the EU was the victim of external machinations, it will be shown that 
this picture is rather too simplistic. Yes, it was caught between the two positions. However, 
several key states, such as Britain and France fully agreed with, and actively supported, the 
US position. As they saw it, any further delay in deciding the status of Kosovo as an 
independent state could be disastrous. However, many others, while not openly siding 
with Russia, were distinctly uneasy about the dangers of going against established 
international principles concerning secession and bypassing the UN Security Council. To 
this end, several efforts were made by senior EU leaders in the spring and summer of 2007 
to try to persuade Moscow to accept Kosovo’s statehood – thereby gaining the necessary 
Security Council resolution to ensure European unity. The problem was that these 
attempts to gain Moscow’s support offered little by way of reasonable rationale or a 
suitable quid pro quo.  
Eventually, therefore, the EU simply gave up and focused on forging its own unity in the 
face of growing US determination to “solve” Kosovo, with or without European support. 
When faced with a choice between Russia’s demand for a strict adherence to international 
law (albeit done for its own purposes), which ran the risk of prolonging an increasingly 
unstable and dangerous situation in Kosovo, and Washington’s overwhelmingly political 
approach to the situation, which would ease tension in Kosovo, but would pose a distinct 
challenge to prevailing international approaches towards secession, most EU leaders – 
often extremely reluctantly – decided that they had no alternative but to follow the US 
lead.  
The right of secession in international law 
Perhaps not unsurprisingly, states tend to have an innate aversion to acts of secession 
(Fierstein 2008). Indeed, the principle of the territorial integrity of states is a central tenet of 
international politics. As one eminent international jurist has put it: 
[t]he truth is that international law upholds the territorial integrity of a State. One of 
the fundamental principles of contemporary international law is that of respect for 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States. This principle entails an obligation 
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to respect the definition, delineation and territorial integrity of an existing State. 
According to the principle, a State exercises sovereignty within and over its territorial 
domain. The principle of respect for territorial integrity is enshrined in the Charter of 
the United Nations and other international instruments (Koroma 2010 para. 21). 
To this extent, a high threshold has been created for entities seeking recognition as 
independent and sovereign states. According to the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the 
Rights and Duties of States, which codified the essential characteristics of statehood, an 
entity claiming to be a state must fulfil three necessary and minimally sufficient conditions. 
In the first instance, it must have a defined territory. Secondly, it must have a settled 
population. Thirdly, it must have some sort of effective administration.2 However, while 
the Montevideo Convention sets down the key features of statehood, and thus provides a 
basic – but non-binding – framework for deciding whether a territory or entity should be 
recognised as a state, other factors play an important role in the process of recognition. 
Notably, the process by which a state emerges has also become extremely important. As 
Fabry notes, ‘since the 1950s, the determining factor in admission of new members into 
the society of states has been whether an entity has a prior right to independence, rather 
than whether it is independent’ (Fabry 2010: 12). For instance, territories that may meet 
the criteria of a state but have been created through acts of aggression are widely 
considered to be illegitimate, even if not always in practice viewed as illegal. Other factors 
also play an important role in shaping the decision of a state of whether or not to 
recognise an entity as a state. In the modern era, and especially since the end of the 
Second World War, perhaps the most powerful of these is the injunction against 
recognising states that have come about through unilateral acts of secession from an 
established and recognised state.  
Of course, entities claiming statehood usually emphasise the right of self-determination. 
However, despite the fact that the principle is explicitly recognised within the UN Charter, 
and has since then been elucidated in international treaties and agreements – such as the 
Helsinki Final Act, which has played a seminal part in shaping peace and security in Europe 
(1975), the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948), the Anti-Colonial Declaration 
(1960), or the Friendly Relations Declaration (1970) – its application has in fact been very 
limited. Since the end of the Second World War, the notion of self-determination resulting 
in the creation of new states has been viewed as a right applicable to cases of European 
decolonisation (Koskenniemi 1994: 241), or else to areas otherwise recognised as being 
under military occupation. Even then, the principle has been narrowly defined as to be 
applicable only at the point of decolonisation or military withdrawal. A new state created 
by an act of decolonisation is, from the very moment of its creation, subject to the very 
rights of protection that apply to other sovereign states. By contrast, in non-colonial 
settings, the principle of self-determination has been regarded as subordinate to the 
principle of territorial integrity. In these cases, self-determination has come to be more 
generally seen as a right to self-administration and self-governance within an existing 
state, a right of internal self-determination (Archibugi 2003), rather than a right to create a 
new state. As Crawford (1997) has stated,  
[i]n international practice there is no recognition of a unilateral right to secede based 
on a majority vote of the population of a sub-division or territory, whether or not that 
population constitutes one or more “peoples” in the ordinary sense of the word. In 
international law, self-determination for peoples or groups within an independent 
state is achieved by participation in the political system of the state, on the basis of 
respect for its territorial integrity. 
                                                
2 For an analysis of these conditions, see Crawford (2006). At the same time, the Convention included a further 
qualification that suggested that an entity wishing to claim statehood must be capable of interacting with 
other states. However, this is not generally considered to be a requirement under international law (Keating 
2008). 
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The collapse of the Soviet Union and the break-up of Yugoslavia did not fundamentally 
alter the way in which the international community approached the question of secession. 
In the case of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Socialist Republics were all considered to have 
an inherent right to statehood as recognised by Russia, the most important of the 
component states, which also sought independence from the Soviet Union (Saideman 
1995). This meant that the three Baltic republics, the three states of the Caucasus and the 
five Central Asian republics were all recognised as sovereign states alongside Belarus and 
Ukraine.3 Yugoslavia proved to be a more difficult example as Serbia, the key republic in 
the Yugoslav federation, sought to keep the federation united, or at least to ensure that 
the Serbs living in the other republics retained a link to Serbia (Pavlowitch 68-69). 
However, the underlying principles guiding recognition nevertheless remained similar. A 
committee of jurists led by Robert Badinter, the president of the French Constitutional 
Court, examined the issue and decided that the six republics recognised under the 1974 
Yugoslavia constitution – Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia 
and Slovenia – all had a right to independence. This right did not, however, extend to the 
national minorities as such – in other words the Serbs, Croats and others as distinct 
peoples. Nor did it extend to the two autonomous Serbian provinces of Vojvodina and 
Kosovo, which, under the 1974 Constitution, were accorded many of the rights of the six 
republics, but did not have a notional right of secession.4 In this sense, and again, 
sovereignty was seen to be vested in units within the state that were, even notionally, 
accorded a right to express a sovereign identity under the terms of the constitution of the 
state they were seceding from.  
Thus the end of the Cold War, while apparently creating challenges to notions of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, in actual fact served to reinforce the traditional views 
on secession.5 Although there have been increasing calls for the right to self-
determination leading to independence to be extended, this has not been accepted by 
national governments. They continue to remain wedded to traditional respect for the 
territorial integrity of states – and only break from it under very exceptional circumstances. 
As Berg (2009: 222) put it, “in short, current legal and normative doctrine forbids de jure 
recognition to those territorial units whose political leadership has been successfully 
resisted by metropolitan central authorities”. 
Even the emergence of new thinking on the limits of state sovereignty – encapsulated 
within the notion of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) – has so far failed to alter entrenched 
views on the territorial integrity of states. Despite the fact that some advocate a new norm 
of remedial secession in cases of gross human rights abuses, this has yet to gain any 
traction in international law. Certainly, when the matter of Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence came before the International Court of Justice, and which decided to avoid 
the underlying question of the right of secession,6 the judges also decided to avoid the 
                                                
3 Belarus and Ukraine were rather interesting inasmuch as they had formally been members of the UN prior to 
the break-up of the Soviet Union, and so did not have to apply for membership as such. Instead, they simply 
informed the UN of a name change. However, this did not mean that they were formally recognised as states 
by the international community, nor did they have their own diplomatic missions to other states. 
4 See Pellet (1992) for a discussion of the work of the Commission. 
5 As Crawford (1997: 114) has noted, states are still reluctant to recognise new states formed outside of the 
colonial experience: “[t]his practice has not changed since 1989, despite the emergence during that period of 
22 new states. On the contrary, the practice has been powerfully reinforced”.  
6 As the majority opinion stated, “[i]n the present case, the question posed by the General Assembly is clearly 
formulated. The question is narrow and specific; it asks for the Court’s opinion on whether or not the 
declaration of independence is in accordance with international law. It does not ask about the legal 
consequences of that declaration. In particular, it does not ask whether or not Kosovo has achieved statehood. 
Nor does it ask about the validity or legal effects of the recognition of Kosovo by those States which have 
recognized it as an independent State […] Accordingly, the Court does not consider that it is necessary to 
address such issues as whether or not the declaration has led to the creation of a State or the status of the acts 
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issue of remedial secession – despite the call by one of their number to address this very 
question (Simma 2010). In the meantime, a number of scholars who have studied the issue 
have concluded that, under current international law, there would seem to be no clear 
right to remedial secession, even if, in practice, it is gaining some relevance (Summers 
2010). Moreover, the argument that such a process can be undertaken years after the 
human rights abuses have ended, and where there is no longer a threat to the community, 
is questionable (Vidmar 2010). Indeed, even those who support Kosovo’s independence 
appear to argue that remedial secession is not really an applicable approach in this 
context – instead arguing that a notion of “earned sovereignty”, whereby the conditions 
laid down by the Montevideo Convention are met, would be more applicable (Boulton 
and Visoka 2010: 20-21). Moreover, even from a practical perspective, there appear to be 
grave doubts about trying to establish a clear norm of remedial secession.7 As will be seen, 
the degree to which the countries that supported Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of 
independence insisted that it was a wholly sui generis case - which therefore cannot be 
viewed as a precedent -, highlights the extent to which they do not want the case of 
Kosovo to become established as a model for secession – remedial or otherwise – for other 
separatist entities. All other things being equal, unilateral secession appears to remain 
unacceptable under international law and according to the standing norms of 
international politics. 
Kosovo, 1999-2008 
In 1999, following a number of attempts to end the fighting between Serb forces and 
separatist Albanian guerrillas, NATO launched an air campaign to end the ethnic conflict in 
Kosovo8. Seventy-eight days later, the Serbian Government under Slobodan Milosevic 
capitulated. Under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, Kosovo was placed 
under UN administration pending a final agreement on the province’s status. Five years 
later, despite attempts to introduce democratic reforms (the “Standards before Status” 
policy9), it was clear that the decision on the future of Kosovo could not be delayed much 
longer. Serious riots, in March 2004, highlighted the growing frustration amongst the 
majority Kosovo Albanians, who were by now openly calling for full independence and 
unless they were given some sort of blueprint for independence there was a real danger 
that international presence could become a target of violence (Human Rights Watch 
2004)10. The following year, the UN Secretary-General commissioned a study into the 
situation from Kai Eide, a senior Norwegian diplomat. In his report, Eide noted that the 
situation on the ground was far from ideal, but that there was little to be gained by 
holding off the status process any longer. As he explained, whatever the outcome of talks 
between Belgrade and Pristina, it was time for the European Union to be given a greater 
role in determining the future of Kosovo, as part of the wider process of regional 
integration (UN Security Council Document 2005a). 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
of recognition in order to answer the question put by the General Assembly” (International Court of Justice 
2010: para.52). 
7 As Boulton and Visoka (2010: 20) note in their analysis of the arguments presented by states supporting 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence, ‘only three other countries explicitly noted human rights abuses, 
suggesting that this is not that dominant international consideration.’ 
8 For a background history of Kosovo, see Malcolm 2002; Vickers 1998. 
9 These were set out as follows: (1) the existence of effective, representative and functioning democratic 
institutions; (2) enforcement of the rule of law; (3) freedom of movement; (4) sustainable returns of refugees 
and displaced persons, and respect for the rights of communities; (5) creation of a sound basis for a market 
economy; (6) fair enforcement of property rights; (7) normalized dialogue with Belgrade; and (8) transformation 
of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) in line with its mandate. 
10 As two prominent observers noted, “Violence had once again advanced the independence agenda as 
nothing else in the previous five years had” (King and Mason 2006: 191). 
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In October 2005, the Security Council authorised the start of formal status talks between 
the Serbian Government and the Kosovo Albanian leadership (UN Security Council 
Document 2005b; 2005c). Shortly afterwards, the Contact Group – a body made up of 
Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the United States – laid down a fundamental set 
of principles to be followed during the discussions. First and foremost, they agreed that 
there could not be a return to the situation that existed prior to 1999. Kosovo could never 
return to direct rule by Belgrade. Likewise, Kosovo could not be partitioned, nor could it 
unite with any other state (Contact Group 2005). To oversee this process, Kofi Annan, the 
then Secretary-General of the UN, appointed Martti Ahtisaari, the former president of 
Finland and an experienced negotiator, to serve as his special envoy (UN Security Council 
Document 2005d). Within weeks, he had established his office in Vienna and travelled to 
the region to meet with the parties. Moreover, despite the fact that it was meant to be a 
process of negotiation between the two sides, he had also decided that independence 
was the only possible outcome – a decision he communicated to the Contact Group as 
well as to the Serbian Government.11 Meanwhile, at a meeting in January 2006, the Contact 
Group decided that in addition to their previous principles, any solution must be 
acceptable to the people of Kosovo (Contact Group 2006). This served to confirm, at least 
in Ahtisaari’s view, that independence was indeed the inevitable end result of the 
process,12 and he lobbied the members of the Contact Group to convey this message to 
Belgrade.13 
In February 2006, face-to-face talks between the two sides got underway. Given that the 
status had already been decided, Ahtisaari decided to focus on the structure of the state. 
The talks therefore focused on local governance and community rights (Weller 2008). 
However, little progress was made. The Kosovo Albanians insisted that there could be no 
negotiations over independence as the final outcome of the process (Associated Press 
2006a). At the same time, Belgrade was adamant that it would only be willing to accept 
some form of extensive autonomy for the province (Ahtisaari 2005). With this in mind, the 
UN team decided to focus more openly on the status question and convened a high-level 
meeting between the political leaders in July. As expected, this did little to break the 
deadlock (Associated Press 2006b). With little goodwill between the sides, and little hope 
of reaching an agreement, the Contact Group authorised Ahtisaari to prepare a status 
proposal (UNOSEK 2006). 
Meanwhile, the Serbian Government, in an attempt to secure its position, passed a new 
constitution affirming Kosovo’s place as an integral part of the Serb state. This new 
constitution was confirmed in a national referendum in October 2006, which in turn paved 
the way for general elections in January 2007. As a result, Ahtisaari was forced to delay 
unveiling his proposals to the two sides until the start of February. Notably, the 54 page-
document laid out in precise details the structure of a state, but made no specific 
reference to sovereignty or statehood. Nevertheless, recognising that this was a blueprint 
for independence, Pristina warmly welcomed the proposals. For its part, Belgrade insisted 
that it would contest any provisions challenging Serbian sovereignty over the province 
(Reuters 2007a; Makfax 2007; Associated Press 2007a)14. However, it was given little 
opportunity to do so. Although two rounds of technical discussions took place in Vienna, 
and concluded with a high level summit between the leaders of the two sides, Ahtisaari’s 
                                                
11 Martti Ahtisaari, conversation with the author, September 2008. 
12 Albert Rohan [Ahtisaari’s deputy], comments to the author, October 2007. 
13 Specifically, he stated that, “the unconstitutional abolition of Kosovo’s authority in 1989, and the ensuing 
tragic events resulting in the international administration of Kosovo have led to a situation in which a return of 
Kosovo to Belgrade’s rule is not a viable option” (Ahtisaari n.d.). 
14 In the days that followed, Çeku also defended the plan provisions for the Kosovo Serbs and other minorities 
(Southeast European Times 2007). But evidently not wanting to appear to keen to accept all the proposed 
terms while further talks were on the agenda, over the next few days he expressed his concern that elements 
of the proposals were too restrictive (Reuters 2007b). 
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team was adamant that any changes to the proposal could only be minor (B92 2007b). It 
therefore came as little surprise when the UN envoy announced at the end of the meeting 
that hopes for a negotiated solution had come to an end, and that compromise between 
the two sides was impossible (Reuters 2007c; B92 2007a). 
Shortly afterwards, at the start of March 2007 Ahtisaari presented his finalised package to 
the UN Secretary-General, who forwarded it on to the Security Council (UN Security 
Council Document 2007a). As expected, the UN Envoy had indeed proposed a form of 
supervised independence for Kosovo. Despite support for the proposals by London, 
Washington, Paris and Berlin, and the hope that a UN resolution could be relatively quickly 
passed endorsing the plan for statehood, it soon became clear that there was a greater 
degree of concern about the proposals within the Security Council than had been 
expected. In addition to Russia, which led the criticisms of the Ahtisaari plan on the 
grounds that it had not secured the support of Belgrade and Pristina (Associated Press 
2007b), many other members of the Council appeared to have serious reservations about 
the idea of sanctioning statehood for Kosovo against the wishes of the Serbian 
Government. To this end, the Council accepted a Russian proposal for a fact-finding 
mission to Brussels, Serbian and Kosovo (Associated Press 2007c; Associated Press 2007d; 
Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty 2007; United Press International 2007a). This provided 
the fifteen permanent representatives had a chance to learn at first hand about the 
situation in the province and the proposals that had been put forward (UN Security 
Council Document 2007b). 
Meanwhile, the United States was becoming increasingly clear in its intentions. During a 
speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, in Washington, Nicholas Burns, the US 
Undersecretary of State, who was taking the lead on Kosovo, insisted that the White House 
would, “support a declaration of independence by the people of Kosovo” (Associated 
Press 2007e), and that the US Administration had told Russian officials that independence 
was “inevitable” (Burns 2007). Perhaps most importantly, Secretary of State, announced 
that the United States would even be prepared to recognise Kosovo without a UN Security 
Council resolution (US Department of State 2007). 
Soon afterwards, in mid-May, the United States and Germany presented a draft resolution 
to the Security Council proposing that Kosovo be awarded supervised independence in 
accordance with the Ahtisaari proposals. Russia immediately objected on the grounds that 
it would not accept an imposed solution. Direct talks between Presidents Bush and Putin 
on the issue during the G8 summit in Germany failed to bridge the differences. In late July, 
it was announced that efforts to try to pass a resolution had been shelved for the 
meantime. Instead, it had been agreed that a further period of talks would be held 
between the two sides. This would be overseen by a Troika of leading diplomats from 
Russia, the United States and the European Union. However, right from the start, there 
were no real expectations that the two sides would be willing to reach an agreement. Any 
incentive on the part of the Kosovo Albanians to compromise had effectively ended when 
President Bush announced, during a trip to Tirana, that the United States supported 
independence. Nevertheless, the Troika explored a range of potential options, including 
forms of autonomy (Serbia presented a number of ideas, including suggestions modelled 
on Hong Kong’s relationship with China and on the Åland Islands in Finland) and partition 
(Government of Serbia 2007)15. Efforts by Wolfgang Ischinger, the EU representative on the 
Troika, to introduce some form of status neutral model, which was essentially based on the 
relationship between East and West Germany during the Cold War, and which would focus 
                                                
15 It was pointed out that the Åland Islands, a group of islands with 27,000 inhabitants, were a Swedish-
speaking autonomous province of Finland that had not only been demilitarised, and its inhabitants exempt 
from conscription in Finland, but also been granted the right to its own flag, raise taxes and customs, issue its 
own postage stamps, administer its own police force, and retain full language and cultural rights. 
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on establishing working relations between Kosovo and Serbia, was also rejected by both 
sides. For the Kosovo Albanians it fell short of full independence, whereas the Serbian 
government viewed it as independence by another name. 
Under these circumstances it came as little surprise when after the last round of 
discussions, held in Austria on 26–28 November, the Troika was forced to concede defeat. 
Delivering their report to the UN Secretary-General on 7 December 2007 (UN Security 
Council Document 2007c), the Troika announced that their four month effort to broker an 
agreement, which had resulted in six face-to-face meetings between the two sides, had 
failed to deliver a breakthrough. As they noted, the two sides had failed to bridge their 
differences over the fundamental notion of sovereignty. As expected, a Security Council 
meeting held on 19 December to discuss the report failed to produce a last-minute 
compromise. After two years of effort, hopes of reaching a negotiated agreement were 
now over. 
Apparent international acceptance for independence 
In large part, the “mess” that was created was a result of misperceptions and 
misunderstandings. At the start of the process, most observers felt that independence was 
the logical outcome and the prevailing view was that all the members of the Contact 
Group were willing to endorse Kosovo’s statehood. Certainly, this path was favoured by 
the United States. As far back as 1999, it was clear that there were many within the US 
administration who strongly favoured an independent Kosovo. However, while support for 
independence was deeply ingrained within certain State Department circles, this does not 
completely explain the situation. Necessity also drove the decision. In the first instance, 
this necessity was driven by the need to end the US military commitment in the Western 
Balkans. With ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, US decision makers needed to 
reduce their military commitments in other locations as much as, and as soon as, possible. 
Tied to this was the danger that, unless resolved quickly, Kosovo could again descend into 
violence. As the frustrations of the Kosovo Albanians grew, the danger that they could 
vent their anger at international forces and administrators grew substantially. If this were 
to turn to open conflict, this could create a potentially troubling and embarrassing 
situation. How would it be possible to explain to a domestic audience at home that the 
people who had been “liberated” by the NATO were now turning on those same 
liberators? It was far easier to be able to declare victory and depart. However, given that 
the Kosovo Albanians would resist any attempt to reintegrate Kosovo back into Serbia, 
even under a high degree of autonomy, the only feasible exit strategy became 
independence. As a result, from a very early stage in the process US officials made it clear 
to their EU counterparts that the United States was intent on recognising independence. 
Europe could either agree, or live with the consequences16. 
Amongst the four EU members within the Group, Britain and France were equally certain 
that the only possible outcome of the process would be some sort of independence. 
Indeed, the French Government was the first to state this to Belgrade, in December 2005 
(TV Pink 2005). Following on from this, a senior British official – John Sawers, the Political 
Director of the Foreign Office – became the first to state it openly, in February 2006 
(Reuters 2006a). For their part, the German and Italian Governments were rather more 
circumspect about the situation. While Berlin also saw the logic of independence it was 
rather more careful in how it expressed its view. For example, the German Ambassador in 
Serbia sought to distance his government from the British comments. Independence was 
not a foregone conclusion (Tanjug 2006b). As for the Italian Government, it had 
                                                
16 Diplomat from an EU member state, comments to the author, 2007. 
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traditionally had the strongest relations of the four with Belgrade and appeared to want to 
maintain a diplomatic silence over the outcome of the process. 
While the United States, Britain and France were explicit regarding its intentions towards 
Kosovo, the Russian government appeared to be sending out rather more equivocal 
signals as to its own position. Nevertheless, the general expectation prior to the start of the 
status talks was that, while the Russian government might have misgivings about granting 
independence to Kosovo, it would soon drop its objections (Bugajski and Joseph 2007). 
While this view may appear with the benefit of hindsight to be naïve or misguided, it 
appeared to many observers to be perfectly justified at the time. After all, at the very start 
of the status process, Moscow had agreed with the other five members of the Contact 
Group on a joint statement noting that any settlement must be acceptable to the people 
of Kosovo – a note that Ahtisaari took to mean support for independence, which was the 
only acceptable solution in the view of the Kosovo Albanians. Similarly, it must be 
remembered that the Russian Government also agreed to allow Ahtisaari to draw up a 
status proposal, even though Russian officials must have known full well what his eventual 
suggestions would entail given that Ahtisaari had, from the very outset of the process, 
made it more than clear to the Contact Group that he saw independence as the only 
possible outcome of the process. Therefore, just as the United States had come out 
strongly in support of independence, the Russian government appeared to be quietly 
signalling its acceptance of that independence. Under these circumstances, it appeared 
likely that the status process would be a relatively straightforward process. 
Understanding Russia’s position 
The problem for European decision makers was that they had in fact misread Russia’s 
position from the outset. Upon closer examination, it was wrong to assume that Russia 
would simply endorse the case for independence. For a start, at every stage in the process, 
Moscow insisted that any settlement must be acceptable to both sides. Russia would 
certainly be willing to accept independence – but only if Belgrade did.17 Secondly, it was 
absolutely insistent that the talks should not be subject to specific timetables. Likewise, 
while the UN Envoy was authorised to draw up proposals as a basis for a settlement, 
Ahtisaari was never given carte blanche to present a comprehensive plan – let alone 
present a proposal that he would then insist was not open to significant amendment. To 
this extent, it can in fact be argued that, at best, Western decision makers misunderstood 
the Russian position (Abramowitz 2008). At worst, they deliberately chose to ignore the 
warning signs. Indeed, even after Putin’s tough warning over Kosovo in early 2007, there 
still appeared to be a general belief that Russia would not block the process. Certainly, no 
efforts were made to plan for the possibility that Moscow was serious about its position 
(Holbrooke 2007). 
This failure to judge Russia’s intentions on Kosovo appears to be the result of several 
factors. First of all, there appears to have been a degree of anti-Russian prejudice at play. 
Indeed, it was telling that many observers fell back on typical stereotypes to explain 
Moscow’s behaviour. For example, some commentators put Moscow’s decision to adopt a 
tough approach on Kosovo down to its wish to stand up to the West and reassert itself on 
the world stage (The Washington Post 2006; Abramowitz 2008). To be sure, under Vladimir 
Putin, Russia sought to reassert its regional and international authority and the discussions 
over Kosovo took place against a backdrop of growing tensions between Russia and the 
West. However, this argument is weakened by the fact that the US approach towards 
Kosovo was also criticised by many liberal pro-Western Russians. For example, in an article 
                                                
17 As several senior ministers pointed out at various points in the process, Russia would not be more Serbian 
than the Serbs (New York Times 2007a; The Independent 2008). 
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published in the Russian press, Mikhail Gorbachev called Kosovo a “dangerous precedent” 
that would be capable of “detonating” conflicts elsewhere in the world. And like many 
other Russians, he was also scathing of the decision by the EU and NATO to pursue a 
settlement outside of the UN Security Council. As he stated,  
[t]his is an unprecedented step, without foundation in political, never mind moral 
terms […] For the first time in history, two organizations are trying to assume 
responsibility for the future of a country – Serbia – which is not a member of either of 
them […] By destroying the international law and replacing it with poorly disguised 
tyranny, the proponents of this approach have certainly miscalculated the outcome 
of their actions (United Press International 2007b). 
Another argument was that Moscow may also have been trying to exact some sort of 
revenge on the United States and NATO for the events of 1999 (Council on Foreign 
Relations 2008; Traynor 2007; Reuters 2008). Again, this could be true. 1999 was certainly a 
humiliation. But it may have been less about extracting revenge than about letting those 
countries that had created the problem find their own solution to the quagmire they had 
made for themselves. Having been sidelined in 1999, Moscow may well have believed that 
it was now under no obligation to provide political cover for NATO as it now sought to 
extricate itself from the political and legal mess it had created (International Crisis Group 
2007). 
While such explanations may well have played a part in Russia’s thinking, Moscow’s 
behaviour can perhaps be better explained by other factors. First of all, the US and EU 
decision makers failed to consider the impact of Kosovo on Russian public opinion and the 
ways in which this shaped Moscow’s reaction. The Russian Government also harboured 
concerns about the impact of allowing Kosovo to be granted independence. In the first 
instance, there was the issue of Slavic solidarity. Many in Russia felt a natural affinity with 
the Serbs and resented the way in which they had been treated in 1999. But this was in fact 
a rather secondary concern. Far more importantly, the question of Kosovo touched on the 
key question of the South Caucasus. If Moscow accepted US demands for Kosovo’s 
independence, there would be an expectation that it would be able to secure 
independence for South Ossetia and Abkhazia as the necessary quid pro quo. It was simply 
not possible for the public to accept that Russia should confirm Kosovo’s statehood 
without payback. For some reason, this was never taken seriously – even though US 
officials, even at the highest level, were warned about the depth of Russian public 
sentiment on the Kosovo issue.18 
Secondly, and crucially, there was a general underestimation of the seriousness with which 
Kosovo was held in Russian domestic circles as a matter of international law. Western 
policy makers failed to appreciate the fact that Russia harboured serious and legitimate 
concerns about the consequences of recognising an independent Kosovo against the will 
of the Serbian Government. For a start, such a move would be unprecedented in modern 
international affairs. Having been recognised as Serbian territory under UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244, and as shown at the start of this article, any attempt to end 
Belgrade’s rule over the territory without Serbian consent would necessarily undermine 
international law. As one senior British diplomat noted, many in the West did not 
understand that when it comes to matters of international law, and the authority of the 
UN, Moscow is not in fact a rogue actor. If anything, it is an arch-conservative.19 Certainly, 
on the question of Kosovo’s statehood, Russia’s views were far closer to the prevailing 
                                                
18 For example, meeting with representatives from a number of Russian NGOs during a visit to Moscow in May 
2007, Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, was explicitly warned not to underestimate the depth of 
Russian feelings on Kosovo (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2007a). 
19 Retired senior British diplomat, comments to the author, November 2006. 
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international opinion on the legality of the matter than those of the United States (The 
Independent 2007).   
The European Union’s position 
Within weeks of the unveiling of the finalised version of the Ahtisaari proposals, the depth 
of division within the European Union was obvious. This was first highlighted at a meeting 
of EU foreign ministers in Bremen, at the end of March 2007, which failed to produce a 
joint position on the proposals (EU Observer 2007). The problem was that, under normal 
circumstances, one would have expected the European Union as a whole to have taken 
the same position as Russia. After all, in other comparable situations of ethnic conflict 
where one group had sought to declare independence – such as Cyprus, South Ossetia, 
Abkhazia and Transdniestra – it had adhered to the prevailing norms on secession and had 
strongly favoured reconciliation within existing borders. Indeed, the seriousness of this 
principle is rather confirmed by the fact that European (and US) officials have repeatedly 
sought to portray Kosovo as a “unique case” precisely in order to ensure that its effects are 
not felt elsewhere. Moreover, it is worth highlighting that even in the case of Kosovo, for 
several years after 1999 many European officials – including diplomats in Britain, the 
strongest EU supporter of independence – still wished to pursue some sort of autonomy 
arrangement for the province, rather than statehood (Ker-Lindsay 2009).  
By the time the status talks started, however, autonomy within Serbia was already no 
longer a feasible option – if, indeed, it really ever had been.20 To try to deny Kosovo 
statehood at this stage would have almost certainly led to catastrophic circumstances. 
Even by the end of 2006, UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) was facing 
growing opposition and threats of violence (UN News Service 2006; South East European 
Times 2006)21. They wanted independence. As one former senior UN official put it, 
“Initially, [Kosovo Albanians] had welcomed UNMIK as a replacement for Serb rule, and as 
what seemed like a steeping stone to that independence. With no progress on status, 
however, many Kosovo Albanians began to see UNMIK as an obstacle instead” (Harland 
2010). Moreover, if the situation continued for much longer it would be more than likely 
that the Kosovo Albanians would simply decide to declare independence unilaterally – a 
repeated threat by Kosovo Albanian leaders (Adnkronos International 2006). Once this 
happened, any attempt by UNMIK to continue administering Kosovo would be all but 
impossible. Indeed, its authority was already declining precipitously. 
                                                
The problem was that if the Kosovo Albanians did decide to pursue independence 
unilaterally, Kosovo would be almost wholly incapable of governing itself. After all, earlier 
attempts to introduce democratic standards prior to status talks had failed despite the 
presence of such a large UN mission. More to the point, there was a distinct possibility that 
the minorities in Kosovo, particularly the Serbian community, would be put in grave 
danger without formal outside supervision. In view of this, the only way in which to avert 
this catastrophe was for the European Union to take over some of the functions of 
governance and try to succeed where UNMIK had failed so badly. However, it was obvious 
that this would only be possible if the Kosovo Albanian population saw this new mission as 
being there by the consent of their own authorities. In other words, with the population 
agitating for the end of international administration, the only way in which the European 
20 As one leading Kosovo Albanian political figure stated, the Kosovo Albanian leadership always saw NATO’s 
intervention in 1999 as a prelude for independence. “[They] understood that Serbia cannot just get out, and 
the process of independence for Kosovo cannot be initiated without the presence of NATO, the EU, and the 
OSCE. A Western protectorate, and later independence through a referendum, is the national strategy of the 
Albanians of Kosova” (Shala 2000: 187). 
21 At the same time, the Albanian National Army (ANA), which the UN termed a terrorist group, was increasing 
its activities in the west of Kosovo (Reuters 2006b). 
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Union could hope to control the situation was by agreeing to Kosovo’s independence, and 
then putting in place a mission with the explicit consent of the government of Kosovo.  
Thus the European Union found itself with a serious dilemma. On the one hand, if it chose 
to take the side of Washington, and bypass the Security Council altogether, it would clearly 
raise serious concerns about international law. On the other hand, if it chose to align with 
Russia it risked destabilising the situation on the ground, which could lead to a rebellion 
against the UN and NATO and leave a dangerous vacuum in the Western Balkans. For 
some countries, it was an easy choice to make. Throughout the discussions, Britain and 
France were firmly supportive of Washington’s position. They too believed that there was 
no alternative to independence – even if that meant supporting a declaration of 
independence that was made without the authorisation of the UN Security Council. As one 
EU official later explained, “The cake has been baked because the Americans have 
promised Kosovo independence. And if Washington recognizes Kosovo and European 
nations do not follow, it will be a disaster” (International Herald Tribune 2008). 
In contrast, a number of smaller states were adamantly opposed to any move to recognise 
Kosovo unless sanctioned by the UN Security Council. These included Spain, as well as a 
number of smaller states that feared the precedent of endorsing a unilateral act of 
secession that appeared to violate international law. Importantly, between the two camps 
lay a third group of states that tended towards the constitutionalist position, but could be 
swayed by pragmatists if it could be shown that all attempts to reach a consensual 
position between the two sides, or gain Security Council endorsement, had failed. The 
most important member of this group was Germany. Although Berlin had voiced support 
for the Ahtisaari proposals, it was nevertheless worried about the legality of recognising 
Kosovo’s independence without the explicit authorisation of the UN.22 
The depth of the problem facing the European Union was highlighted during the Brussels 
leg of the UN fact finding mission, in April 2007. Meeting with EU officials, the ambassadors 
were told that a united European position on the question of independence would require 
a Security Council resolution (UN Security Council Document 2007; Associated Press 
2007f). As Bernard Kouchner, the French foreign minister, who had also served as a UN 
Special Representative in Kosovo, noted, the question of Kosovo’s status was as one of the 
most difficult problems ever encountered by the EU (Associated Press 2007g). Another put 
it more succinctly, EU policy on Kosovo was a “chaotic mess”23. 
EU-Russian engagement 
Realising that the hopes of an agreement between Belgrade and Pristina were minimal, 
and fearing the divisions that would emerge within its own ranks if a Security Council 
resolution was not passed endorsing independence, senior EU leaders, rather than try to 
engage with the sides, instead attempted to secure Russian support for the Ahtisaari 
proposals for independence. For example, as early as February 2007, when the proposals 
had only just been unveiled, the EU sought to allay Russian concerns that a status decision 
on Kosovo might set a precedent elsewhere. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU commissioner 
for external affairs, tried to reassure Moscow that any decision on Kosovo would not have 
a wider effect on Russia’s autonomous regions (Interfax 2007a; The Washington Times 
2007). It was evidently not enough. Speaking days later, at the 43rd Munich Conference on 
Security Policy, Putin issued a sharp rebuke to the West over a number of issues, including 
Kosovo. Arguing that it was in the interests of the US and the EU that international law was 
upheld, he insisted that a settlement must be reached between the sides and openly 
                                                
22 Wolfgang Ischinger [the EU representative on the Troika], interview with the author, December 2008. 
23 Wolfgang Ischinger, interview with the author, December 2008. 
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criticised Washington for attempting to impose a Kosovo settlement against Belgrade’s 
wishes, arguing that this would set a precedent for conflicts elsewhere. In a particularly 
notable turn of phrase, he argued that no one had the right to play “Lord God” and make 
decisions for other nations (Interfax 2007b). 
Thereafter, a number of further efforts were made to persuade Moscow to change its 
mind. It refused each time. For example, pressure was put on Moscow at an extremely 
acrimonious meeting in the southern Russian town of Samara, in May 2007. In response, 
Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, warned against trying to impose a solution 
from outside; arguing that anyone who believed that Kosovo could be solved by the EU, 
the US and Russia was obviously burdened by “colonial instincts”. He also reiterated that if 
Kosovo were to become independent it would inevitably become a precedent, regardless 
of whether or not anyone wanted it to be one (BBC News 2007; B92 2007c). Thereafter, 
another attempt to win Russian support, during a tense meeting of G8 foreign ministers in 
Potsdam, a week prior to the G8 summit, also failed. When Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the 
German Foreign Minister, appealed to Russia to give up its objection to Kosovo’s 
independence, Lavrov again refused, asking why other, longer-standing issues, such as the 
Western Sahara and Palestine, were not being dealt with first (International Herald Tribune 
2007; Reuters 2007d). 
The strength of Russian feeling on the issue was further emphasised to European leaders 
when Putin travelled to Austria and Luxembourg and delivered a further warning against 
any moves to grant Kosovo statehood (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2007b). He also 
reiterated his opposition to imposed independence at the G8 summit meeting, where 
Kosovo was discussed over lunch. It was at this point that the new French president, 
Nicolas Sarkozy, switched tack and tried to win Moscow over.  However, it was done in a 
ham-fisted manner. Calling upon Russia to accept the “unavoidable prospect” of 
independence, he proposed that a resolution be delayed for six months to allow for 
further talks to take place. If, after that, no agreement had been reached, the Ahtisaari plan 
would be implemented. With no chance that the Kosovo Albanians would support 
anything but independence, especially given such strong US support, this initiative was 
little more than an attempt to placate Moscow with what would obviously be little more 
than a façade of dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. While the call for new talks was 
certainly welcome, Moscow was unwilling to accept that independence would be the 
inevitable outcome of the process. Speaking at the end of the summit, Putin again 
stressed that no final decision on the status of Kosovo without Serbia’s agreement and 
warned that attempting to do so would set a precedent (Austrian Associated Press 2007; 
Reuters 2007e; Reuters 2007f; Agence France-Presse 2007a; Financial Times 2007a). 
On balance, therefore, it was hardly surprising that these efforts met with little success. The 
comment that Kosovo would have no effect on Russian regions was a particularly ham-
fisted effort. By even raising the issue of the regions, it rather suggested that the EU 
considered that there were potential cases of secession that could appeal to the Kosovo 
precedent. Likewise, the use of the sui generis argument was problematic and showed just 
how little the EU was able to grasp the delicacy of the situation in Russia. Had Russia 
decided to accept this line of argument, it would be read as caving in to US and EU 
demands on Kosovo without securing anything at all in return on South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, while at the same time severely undermining Moscow’s claim to being a 
champion of international law and state sovereignty. Indeed, this line of argumentation 
may in fact have served to make matters worse inasmuch as it effectively ensured that it 
would close the door to Russia to extend the same principle to the South Caucasus.  
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Thereafter, by August 2007, when the Troika started its work, it appeared as if the 
European Union simply gave up trying to persuade Moscow to change its position. While 
the decision to form the Troika may have appeared to be a genuine attempt to reach a 
compromise between the sides, it was undermined by the obvious intention of the US to 
recognise Kosovo regardless – as evidenced by Bush’s comments in Albania. It was 
therefore doomed before it began. However, it did serve another, equally important 
purpose inasmuch as it was also designed to win over the group of states that saw the 
pragmatic argument for independence, but were concerned about the legal issues. It was 
designed to achieve European unity as much as to try to find a solution between Belgrade 
and Pristina.24 By showing that any agreement between the sides was utterly impossible, 
and that Russia was simply obstructing independent, the hope was that this would 
persuade them to accept Kosovo’s statehood without explicit UN Security Council 
authorisation. In this regard, the Troika mission provided the cover necessary to this 
middle group of states to make a political decision, despite concerns over the legality of 
this decision. On this score, the Troika was successful. As was noted, at the start of the 
summer, the EU had been hopelessly divided. By the end of the process, most of the EU 
states that had harboured earlier reservations, most importantly Germany, had been 
persuaded that there was no other choice but to support independence (B92 2007d; 
Agence France-Presse 2007b)25. By now, Russia’s position had become all but irrelevant in 
amongst the EU states on the Contact Group. 
Conclusion 
In 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia. Within days it had been 
recognised by the United States and a number of the larger members of the European 
Union. In the months that followed, many others followed suit. However, five EU members 
– Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain – have steadfastly refused to recognise 
Kosovo; as have Russia, China and the large majority of UN members. According to the 
standard narrative that has emerged in EU circles, the unilateral declaration of 
independence was widely viewed as a major defeat for European diplomacy. Having been 
recognised as the key actor shaping the future of the Western Balkans, the Union had 
singularly failed to provide leadership on the issue and fell victim to Russian and American 
machinations. However, while there has been a tendency to apportion blame equally to 
Washington and Moscow for this state of affairs, on closer examination a more complex 
picture emerges. 
Certainly, a large degree of responsibility lies with the United States. As several senior US 
officials stated on the eve of the declaration of independence, “While some European 
countries, notably members of the EU, may feel themselves obligated to join us in 
recognizing Kosovo’s independence, a number of those countries would do so reluctantly 
because of Washington’s inflexibility and insistence” (Bolton, Eagleburger and Rodman 
2008). Partly out of ideology and partly out of necessity, the United States saw no 
alternative to independence,26 and pursued this option. But it is wrong to believe that 
                                                
24 Wolfgang Ischinger, interview with the author, December 2008.  
25 As officials explained, while this decision might not be strictly according to the letter of Resolution 1244, it 
would nevertheless be taken in the spirit of the resolution, which envisaged an eventual decision on Kosovo’s 
status. This was later explicitly elucidated in the document placing an EU mission in Kosovo, which stated that, 
“Acting to implement the final status outcome in such a situation is more compatible with the intentions of 
1244 than continuing to work to block any outcome in a situation where everyone agrees that the status quo is 
unsustainable” (BBC News 2008a). 
26 A case can be constructed that there was in fact an alternative. Leaving aside the obvious desire of certain 
key officials to support an independent Kosovo and in doing so punish Serbia, the necessity argument is open 
to challenge. For a start, there was already a realisation in international circles that Kosovo would increasingly 
become a European issue in the future. The European Union was already taking the lead role in the NATO 
KFOR mission. It was also poised to take over many of the UNMIK administrative responsibilities. To this extent, 
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Europe was simply an innocent bystander caught up in a resurgent Cold War, as some 
have suggested. From the very start, a number of key actors openly sided with the United 
States on the question of independence. Indeed, Britain and France took a far more 
forthright position far earlier than Washington. In other words, the failure to achieve 
European unity over the question of Kosovo was not as a result of the agenda having been 
hijacked by Washington, but by the fact that several EU members had also taken a position 
in favour of independence without having sought to engage in a full and open debate on 
the issue with their European partners. Of course, the argument can be made that this 
debate was felt to be unnecessary at the start of the status process, when there appeared 
to be an international consensus in favour of independence. However, as was shown, there 
was never any solid evidence to support the view that Russia was in fact willing to 
acquiesce on the question of statehood.  
By the time the extent and depth of Russia’s opposition to independence without Serbia’s 
permission was understood, it was too late to change course. Washington was openly set 
on statehood and had publicly made it clear that it would recognise Kosovo even without 
UN support. At this point, EU leaders sought to try to persuade Moscow – rather than 
Washington – to change its mind, even though the Russian position on the question of 
mutually agreed secession was far closer to what would usually have been expected to be 
the EU position. However, little incentive was offered to Moscow to change its mind. EU 
leaders appeared to have no understanding of the dynamics at play within Russia, and 
showed little desire to acknowledge Russia’s concerns about the wider effects of the 
Kosovo precedent. Relatively quickly, therefore, the key EU states appeared to abandon 
efforts to try to reach a compromise, instead focusing their efforts on providing the degree 
of political cover needed to secure the support of the middle group of EU states that could 
be persuaded to support Kosovo’s independence without Security Council authorisation. 
Viewed retrospectively, this does in fact appear to be the main purpose of the much-
vaunted Troika process.  
In view of these circumstances, the Russian position certainly does not seem to be as 
obstructive and malicious regarding Kosovo as some observers have argued subsequently. 
As has been shown, it was the United States, acting with the support of key EU states, 
which eventually forced the EU to abandon constitutionalism – and not Russia. In fact, 
Russia was always far more in line with prevailing international norms regarding secession. 
(Importantly, this argument has not been undermined by the International Court of 
Justice’s opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, delivered in July 
2010. Although it argues that a declaration as a mere statement is not contrary to 
international law, the judges deliberately and clearly insisted that their majority opinion 
did not judge whether the act of secession was in fact legal (International Court of Justice 
2010)27.) Indeed, had it not been the case that the United States and key EU members 
                                                                                                                                                     
US engagement with Kosovo was already declining significantly. To be sure, the Kosovo Albanians wanted 
independence. However, there are good reasons to argue that had the United States stood firm and made it 
clear that this was not an option, at least at this stage, and that any attempt to press ahead with a unilateral 
declaration of independence, or destabilise the situation, would be met with united international 
condemnation it is likely that the Kosovo Albanians could have been persuade to take a more moderate 
approach and discuss other options, such as full autonomy. It would not have been easy, but had US officials 
taken a firm line, the situation may well have been manageable. But they did not. Instead, they chose to adopt 
a position that they knew was, at best, highly controversial in terms of international law and sought to force 
the EU to follow suit. 
27 As the judges stated, in paragraph 52, “In the present case, the question posed by the General Assembly is 
clearly formulated. The question is narrow and specific; it asks for the Court’s opinion on whether or not the 
declaration of independence is in accordance with international law. It does not ask about the legal 
consequences of that declaration. In particular, it does not ask whether or not Kosovo has achieved statehood. 
Nor does it ask about the validity or legal effects of the recognition of Kosovo by those States which have 
recognized it as an independent State […] Accordingly, the Court does not consider that it is necessary to 
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pushed too hard for independence, and forced most of the rest of the European Union to 
take sides so openly, it is highly likely that the EU as a whole would have continued to look 
for some sort of solution that fell short of full independence, as has originally been hoped 
in the aftermath of the 1999 NATO campaign. Instead, when it was clear that this was 
unacceptable to Kosovo Albanians and would almost certainly lead to violence against 
international officials, the majority of EU members were left having to try to support the 
rather specious argument that Kosovo represented a “unique case” in international politics 
– an argument that carried very little weight on the wider international stage – in order to 
create the conditions whereby it could try to stabilise the situation after the unilateral 
declaration of independence.  
Of course, it would be wrong to argue that Russia bore no responsibility for the situation 
that arose. Like the United States, its position was driven by more than a little self-interest. 
Had the west been willing to do a deal that linked Kosovo’s fate with that of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia, it seems more than likely that Russia’s seemingly principled stance would 
have disappeared quickly. Be that as it may, it can be clearly shown that the EU’s disunity 
was not the result of Russia’s “constitutionalism”. If anything, the EU was instead a “victim” 
of the “pragmatism” of the United States and several of its own members. Moreover, 
notwithstanding the fact that Moscow’s claim to the higher moral and legal ground were 
wholly undermined by its subsequent decision to recognise the unilateral declarations by 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia,28 the fact remains that throughout the period under 
examination in this piece, Moscow’s position was far more in line with the international 
legal norms than the line taken by the United States. Had it not been for the dire situation 
on the ground, a situation that had the potential to directly affect key EU members as well 
as the United States, it is highly likely that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence 
would have found little support in EU circles given that it so clearly went against long 
standing international legal principles and norms.  
*** 
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